HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES AND PARTY SYSTEM RESPONSIVENESS IN SEVEN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the congruence of representation directly after the "third wave" of democratization in Latin America, and on its historical origins. It tests the argument according to which party systems that experienced ideological polarization in the early 20th century were set on a programmatic track and today are likely to exhibit high levels of congruence in the representation of their voters' interests. In other contexts, where elites relied heavily on clientelistic resources to de-mobilize the citizenry when the suffrage was expanded in the first half of the 20th century, programmatic representation is likely to remain weak until the 1990s. These hypotheses are verified by combining the PELA-surveys of Latin American legislators with mass-level survey data. The results not only reveal important contrasts in the congruence of representation across the seven countries studied, but also that these differences can be explained rather well by historical patterns of party system formation.

Keywords: Party systems, Representation, Linkages, Path dependency, Cleavages, Quality of Democracy.

1. Introduction

The first euphoria over the unprecedented diffusion of democratic rule around the world in the "Third Wave" of democratization has given way to more gloomy assessments of the quality of democracy in many of these countries. Starting with O'Donnell's (1994) famous warning of a new type of "delegative democracy", attention has shifted from the factors explaining the transition to formal democratic regimes to those capable of accounting for differences in the *quality* of democracy. This paper focuses on the congruence of representation as a vital aspect of the quality of democracy (Pitkin, 1967; Dahl, 1971; Powell, 2000; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Disch 2011). The main purpose of the paper is to provide an assessment of the responsiveness of party systems in seven Latin American countries for the earliest point in time for which adequate data is available. Contrary to prior studies by Luna and Zechmeister (2005, 2010), I do not measure congruence along theoretically determined issue categories, but start out by determining the politically relevant dimensions underlying party positions (for a similar approach, see Rivas-Perez 2008). To measure party positions, I use the Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA) (see Alcántara Sáez, 2008). I then assess the congruence of representation by measuring the positions of party electorates along the same dimensions based on individual-level data from the World Values Survey (WVS).

This paper also extends on prior work by anchoring the quantitative analysis of political representation in a historical cleavage account of party system formation. I derive expectations regarding the extent to which party competition is rooted in distinctive ideological appeals by analyzing party system trajectories along two critical junctures. First, where nationalized elite party systems developed towards the turn of the 19th and the 20th century, this triggered the formation of strong conservative parties. This, in turn, provided favorable preconditions for the formation of responsive party systems when new middle and working class parties arose, which constitute the second critical juncture. While this argument is presented in more detail elsewhere (Bornschier 2012), I provide a very brief recapitulation of the historical model and argue that historical bifurcations and sequences set party systems on distinctive tracks between the early and the mid-20th century, which have long-term effects on party system responsiveness.

Because political actors may subsequently modify these historical patterns, the analysis should focus on the situation directly after the process of re-democratization occurred in Latin America as part of the Third Wave of democratization. The earliest point in time for which data is available is the mid-1990s, however. Here, the combination of the PELA elite surveys and the WVS allows an analysis of the cases of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. These countries show some important variation with respect to the historical trajectories postulated above, and they encompass both cases where democracy was established anew in the 1980s, as well as long-established (formal) democracies such as Colombia and Venezuela.

This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss how responsive party systems are formed, and how programmatic responsiveness competes with another, much older type of linkage between parties and voters: clientelism. I then summarize the expectations based on the historical analysis mentioned above pertaining to the differences within my sample of countries in terms of the responsiveness of their party systems. In the third section, I draw on political theory and on the cleavage theory to substantiate my analytical approach to the measurement of representational congruence. The most important question to be settled concerns the identification of the issues or dimensions for which the congruence of representation is assessed, and whether we should take voter preferences or party positions as a starting point. The following section then specifies the issue categories used in the analysis, discusses their operationalization, and the methods appropriate to deriving dimensions from the issue categories.

The fifth section presents the results of the analysis, and has two parts. The first discusses the make-up of the relevant party system divides in the seven countries and assesses whether these divisions are also the most relevant among voters. The second part presents the results of the analysis of the congruence. The positions of parties are plotted against those of their voters and the correlation between party positions and voter preferences is derived as a measure of the congruence of representation. The results testify that historical party system trajectories indeed have long-term implications of patterns of responsiveness in the 1990s. At the same time, they point to the capacity of political actors to modify those historical patterns, opening interesting avenues of research that explore the interplay of path dependency and political agency.

2. The formation of responsive party systems and expectations for Latin America

2.1 Party system responsiveness and its impediments

As the actors linking citizens and the political system, parties play a central role in guaranteeing democratic governance. In a path-breaking approach, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) have argued that democratization entails not only the building of formal democratic institutions, but also of party systems that represent the interests of voters in the political process. Only when the basic patterns of opposition or conflict are stable do party systems structure the expectations of political actors and introduce predictability in politics. This, on the other hand, is considered a central prerequisite of democratic accountability and of the congruence between citizens and their representatives (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mair 1997, 2001, Tóka 1998, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006).

According to the distinction set out by Kitschelt (2000, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), between programmatic, clientelistic, and charismatic linkages between parties and voters, the main impediment to the formation of responsive party systems is the dominance of clientelistic and charismatic linkages in many new democracies. Because the parties of notables characteristic of pre-democratic elite party systems usually employ clientelistic means to stay in power once the suffrage is extended (c.f., Gunther & Diamond 2003: 175-7), I claim that much depends on whether these parties are subsequently challenged by strong ideological movements. To the degree that the established parties are able to prevent new competitors from entering the system, clientelistic practices are likely to remain unaltered. As Shefter (1977, 1993) and Geddes (1994) have argued and empirically shown, established parties are able to secure their position by distributing particularistic benefits. Hagopian's (1996) case study of Brazil reveals that clientelism is an instrument of long-established political elites to hold on to their positions of power and privilege. Only "externally mobilized parties", in Shefter's terminology, which do not have access to the ruling circles of power, push for programmatic competition – because programs are all they have to offer. By the same token, it can be hypothesized that once ideological party competition has been established and parties appeal to voters by offering distinctive policy options, clientelistic promises will no longer prove very successful. For voters that are sufficiently informed and are offered clear programmatic options, selling their vote for a particularistic benefit is unlikely to be an attractive option. Consequently, the initial emergence of a party system that is responsive to the preferences of the citizenry emerges as a decisive moment in the evolution of party systems.

The Western European historical experience testifies that functional conflicts resulting from large-scale processes of nation state formation and industrializing were capable of forming party systems based on powerful ideologies and firmly rooted in social structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 1999, Caramani 2004, Bartolini 2005). Latin American trajectories have proven much more varied. While some

party systems, such as the Brazilian one, have emerged more or less from scratch after every disruption of democratic rule, those in Uruguay and Chile still carry the imprint of the conflicts prevalent in the early decades of the 20th century, when democracy was first established (Dix 1989, González 1995, Scully 1995, Coppedge 1998, Mainwaring 1999). Other party systems have proved highly stable, but the initial conflicts have faded, and as a result of the ensuing loss of differentiation between party profiles, competition has come to center primarily on particularistic benefits. Colombia and Venezuela between 1958 and the late 1980s are cases in point, as I will argue.

2.2 Two critical junctures and resulting expectations

These differences can be explained by the interaction of two critical junctures that set responsive and non-responsive party systems in Latin America apart.[1] The first bifurcation is between party systems that institutionalized elite conflict before the expansion of the suffrage in the early 20th century, and those that did not. Where rival elites relied on political parties of national scope to resolve conflicts, pluralistic elite party systems emerged (Coppedge 1998). Gibson (1996) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) have convincingly argued that nationwide conservative parties strong enough to withstand the mobilization of progressive forces are crucial in defending the interests of economic and political elites and making democracy viable when the suffrage is expanded. Combining these insights, I argue that the effect of early pluralism lies precisely in triggering the formation of nationwide conservative parties. At the second critical juncture, which I call the polarization phase, the political establishment is challenged by externally mobilized parties. These are mostly parties of the left, but because they sometimes meshed socialist and Fascist ideas, I will refer to them as progressive parties. Where their mobilization resulted in a balance of power between old parties and new claimants for power, ideological polarization was sustained long enough for clientelism to recede and for strong partisan attachments to develop. Political conflict then socialized successive generations of voters into the prevailing lines of conflict, perpetuating these alignments.[2]

In Latin America – and ignoring the Central American variations – only Chile and Uruguay clearly followed this route. Chile presents the classical case in that new political actors of the political left and the Christian Democrats strongly polarized the party system (e.g., Scully 1992). The fact that the Uruguayan party system is a case of high polarization is often overlooked due to the strong role of the two traditional parties until quite recently. However, the Colorados' adoption of a progressive profile firmly rooted the party in the working class and polarized the party system (Collier and Collier 2002). The Communist party was never outlawed, and the threat from the left forced the Colorados to maintain their left-wing position. While clientelism played a major role in certain phases of Uruguayan history, González (1991: 25-8) convincingly argues that politics in Uruguay was never only a matter of clientelism, as some may have it. The Frente Amplio, which united the Communists, the Christian Democrats, and other progressive forces, then launched the most severe assault on clientelism from the 1960s on (Luna n.d., González 1991: 125).

Contrary to the slender path to a responsive party system, a variety of trajectories results in settings in which clientelism remains so pervasive that it is difficult for voters to identify contrasting policy platforms. What they have in common is that no sustained polarization of the party system occurred in the first half of the 20th century. I call this aborted polarization due to the conscious effort either of the established parties, or of successful revolutionary movements to restrict competition. There are two basic

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1 This argument is presented in full and substantiated with historical evidence in Bornschier (2012).
2 For theoretical depictions of this process, see Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Bornschier (2010, 2012).

ways impede polarization: The first is an outright ban on opposition parties. In a more subtle form, established parties use their monopoly on clientelistic resources to secure their position and exclude challenging parties. If elites succeed using either of these strategies, a dominant party system results, even if more than one party competes in elections and the system appears pluralistic at first sight. However, these contexts lack what Levitsky and Way (2010a) term a "level playing field", making it next to impossible for opposition parties to gain power (see also Greene 2007, Lyne 2008). Two very different trajectories result in the formation of dominant party systems: either the older elite parties restrict competition, or of a revolutionary movement succeeds in sweeping the old elite away and establishes dominance.

In Colombia, elites restricted competition after the civil war, despite the fact that conservative interests held a strong position in both traditional parties, one of the few features the country's party system shared with that in Uruguay. There is abundant evidence that clientelistic linkages predominate in Colombia at least since the late 1950s.[3] In Mexico and Venezuela, progressive parties won over their conservative rivals, resulting in a dominant party system. Despite some degree of open contestation, the Mexican Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) was able to maintain dominance for decades thanks to the distribution of patronage and political favors.[4] In Venezuela, a party cartel agreed to share power in 1958, and the party system soon lost any clear ideological differentiation.[5]

Finally, the frequent intervention of the military impeded prolonged ideological polarization in Peru and Argentina. As a result, Peru's Popular Revolutionary American Alliance (APRA) moved to the center in an illusive quest to gain acceptance by the military, watering down the party's programmatic profile (Collier and Collier 2002: 476-483). Furthermore, rather than ousting clientelistic linkages, APRA seems to have engaged in extensive patronage and clientelistic change itself (ibid., Hilliker 1971: 74-113). The main difference between Peru and Argentina is that in the latter case, Peronism's dominance in the union movement kept the antagonism between Peronists and non-Peronists – primarily represented by the Radicals in the party arena – alive even during non-democratic periods (Collier and Collier 2002: 359-9, 484-97, 721-42). As a result, strong political identities formed despite a rather limited experience with open democratic competition. Thus, a party system rooted in social structure re-emerged in the 1980s.[6] Consequently, I expect intermediate levels of party system responsiveness in Argentina, while Peru is likely to display low levels of programmatic structuring and congruence between parties and voters.

3. The measurement of party system responsiveness: Theory and analytical approach

The responsiveness of governments to the preferences of citizens is a defining attribute of polyarchy according to Robert Dahl (1971, 1989), or of representation according to Hannah Pitkin (1967). One of the central junctures in the "chain of responsiveness" (Powell 2004) that runs from public preferences to political policies, is the congruence between voter preferences and party positions. According to what Thomassen (1994: 251-2) calls the "responsible party model", congruence is achieved if parties offer diverging programmatic offerings, and if voters chose parties according to these offerings.[7]

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3 See Wilde (1978), Archer (1990, 1995), Martz (1997: 35), Collier and Collier (2002: 671-3), Di Tella (2004: 94-6), Pizarro Leongómez (2006).

4 See McDonald and Ruhl (1989: 48-9, 51-2), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 199-4), Langston and Morgenstern (2009), Levitsky and Way (2010b: 149-161).

5 See Karl (1986: 213), Coppedge (1994: 18-46, 136-52), Roberts (2003), Lyne (2008).

6 See Di Tella (2004: 164-70), Madsen and Snow (1991: 134-50), McGuire (1995: 233-6).

7 Thomassen (1994) further points out that parties must be cohesive enough to implement their program. While the focus of this paper is on the congruence between representatives and voters, the data will also allow us to assess the cohesiveness of political parties and the likelihood that they will implement diverging programs.

Consequently, the quality of representation has frequently been assessed by looking at the congruence between the political preferences of voters and their representatives (e.g., Dalton 1985, Powell 2000, Luna and Zechmeister 2005, 2010; see also Diamond and Morlino 2005).

There is less consensus on how to define the substantial issues relevant for measuring the congruence of representation. In the advanced democracies, both the left-right dimension (e.g., Klingemann 1995, Powell 2000), as well as more specific issue categories have been used (e.g., Dalton 1985). In one of the rare analyses of this kind conducted in Latin America, Luna and Zechmeister (2005, 2010) measure responsiveness across five issue bundles, each of which is tapped using at least two separate issues. The potential problem with their approach is that we do not know whether all of these issue bundles (and the items used to measure them) are in fact politically relevant. If not, we should not expect congruence, as the issue will play no role in determining party choice. Congruent representation then results of chance, rather than following the postulates of the responsible party model: If the issue happens to aligns with a relevant dimension of conflict, congruence will be high; if not, it will be low. For this reason, unless we have strong theoretical reasons to expect specific issues to be politically relevant across all countries, starting with a pre-defined set of issues involves at least two problems. First, it risks underestimating the degree of congruent representation due to the inclusion of issues that are not salient, and where congruence is likely to be low. Second, such an approach biases the results in favor of those countries where issues are strongly integrated into over-arching dimensions.

For this reason, I start out by empirically assessing the relevant dimensions of political conflict for each country. This immediately poses the question whether these dimensions should be determined among voters or at the level of the party system. According to the classical, unidirectional notion of representation, voters chose "promissory" representatives who promise to implement certain policies (Mansbridge 2003, Disch 2011). Consequently, the issues most relevant to voters should constitute the starting point of an analysis of the quality of representation. Apart from the empirical difficulty of assessing what these issues might be,[8] however, such an approach would neglect the independent role of the party system in shaping the link between the social and the political (Sartori 1968). From a cleavage perspective, parties bundle issues into broader dimensions that help voters make sense of what political conflict is about (Schattschneider 1975). Citizens will only be able to chose representatives that endorse their substantive policy preferences if parties "stand for something", in Klingemann et al.'s (1994) words. What is more, cleavage theory assumes that new generations of voters are socialized into the prevailing structure of conflict, thus assigning an important role to elite political actors in shaping politics (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Bornschier 2010: Ch. 3). This mechanism also implicitly underlies the critical juncture approach outlined in the preceding section, as it explains why ideology continues to play an important role in those party systems that are set on a programmatic track early on.

There are also normative perspectives on representation that would suggest a focus on elite conflict. Disch (2011) has recently suggested that political theory should come to terms with the abundant empirical literature suggesting that political parties play an important role in shaping citizen preferences. In what she aptly calls a "mobilization conception of political representation", the representative process is theorized as dynamic and interactive, without necessarily implying that parties manipulate the preferences of their supporters.

The point of departure for measuring congruence in this paper is thus constituted by the dimensions that set parties apart. In an intermediate step, I then assess whether these are also the divides

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8 A viable strategy is that pursued by Moreno (1999).

relevant at the voter level, as the mobilization conception of representation would suggest. Where this is the case, the quality of representation is obviously higher. However, we cannot derive a measure of the congruence of representation across cases where the dimensions at elite and voter levels match and where they do not. For this reason, I reconstruct the dimensions found among elites at the voter level for the measurement of how well parties are in tune with their voters.

4. Operationalization and methods

The analysis uses data from the first wave of the University of Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA), for which face-to-face interviews with legislators were conducted between 1995 and 1996. This point in time is very close to the fieldwork of the World Values Survey's (WVS) 1994-99 wave, where most interviews were also conducted in 1995 and 1996. Combining these data sources, it is possible to assess the congruence of representation in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Colombia does not form part of the first wave of the PELA surveys, but the 1998 survey happens to coincide exactly with the year in which the fieldwork for the WVS was conducted in that country. The analysis thus covers seven countries in total.

I start out by grouping the issue-specific items contained in the elite and mass surveys into the following, theoretically defined issue-categories:[9]

Economic issues

- *Welfare*: Expansion of or defense of a generous welfare state, support for public education, redistribution, and equality.
- *Economic liberalism*: Opposition to market regulation, and protectionism, support for deregulation, for more competition, and privatization.

Non-economic issues

- *Regime:* Assessment of past military regime (if there was a military dictatorship). Additional issues used on the demand side: support for democracy, opposition against authoritarianism.
- *Army* (only measured at the supply side): Support for a strong national defense, against reducing the military's budget (to some extent, this can be interpreted as a regime dimension).
- *Cultural liberalism*: Opposition to traditional moral values, support for gender equality, the right to abortion and divorce.
- *Environmental protection*: Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic energy.

I use principal component factor analysis to test whether the items indeed measure the same underlying concept. A list of the items used and a schematic summary of the results of the factor analyses are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. There are several reasons for using more general issue categories, rather than individual items in the analysis. Most importantly, politically relevant issue-categories are typically broader than the items used in elite and mass surveys. Consequently, we will want to include more than one item for each concept in order to reduce measurement error and to tap the

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9 The categories are derived from an analysis of political space in Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 2008), and adapted to the Latin American context.

underlying issue categories, rather than more specific aims.[10] Moreover, if we were to assess the congruence using specific items, we question wording would have to be identical, which is not typically the case. If we include as many items as possible to measure broader underlying categories, on the other hand, we can compare political supply and political demand even if the items do not match exactly. The categories are operationalized separately for each country, since we cannot be sure that the items form part to the same category in each country. Moreover, some categories may in fact be too broad: In the case of the regime issue, the items often yield more than one dimension. Most of the time, the multiple dimensions make sense in theoretical terms. Where issue categories proved to me multi-dimensional, I thus use all of the sub-components to assess the dimensionality of political conflict.[11]

To determine the relevant dimensions of conflict based on the issue categories described above, I rely on discriminant analysis. This technique reveals which issues structure party membership, and we can interpret which broader political divisions these issues represent.[12] The main alternative, factor analysis, only tells us which dimensions underlie legislators' orientations, not whether representatives actually mobilized on those dimensions. In fact, factor analysis tends to produce more dimensions in countries where discriminant analyses reveal party membership to be only weakly structured by ideology (e.g., Peru), and the factors are not always easy to interpret. On the other hand, factor analysis produced a unidimensional solution for Chile, while discriminant analysis revealed traces of the religious cleavage that help to explain ideological differences between the parties within the left and right blocks.

On the voter side, most of the issue categories can be operationalized using items contained in the WVS (see Table A2). The exception are attitudes regarding the army. On the other hand, voters give reasonably varied responses to questions regarding the desirability of democracy and the support for authoritarian rule, while the corresponding items yield uniformly pro-democratic responses in the PELA surveys, and thus cannot be used. Again, I combine items into issue categories using principal component factor analysis. In a second step, I measure positions along the *dimensions* found in the elite analysis, combining the relevant issue categories into dimensions, again using factor analysis.[13]

A methodological word of caution is in order here: Because the positions of parties and voters are measured on different scales, they cannot be directly compared, and the correspondence can be judged only in relative terms. Because respondents' answers may vary according to the wording of the question in the survey, there is no way to make the two scales strictly comparable. Nonetheless, it is possible to measure the match of representation – or the responsiveness of the party system – by calculating the correlation between the mean positions of parties and the mean position of their respective electorates.

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10 Rosas (2010: 87-94) performs a discriminant analysis of the ideological dimensions structuring legislatures similar to mine, using the same data. Because he uses the individual items contained in the PELA surveys, rather than operationalizing broader issue categories, there are some (minor) differences in our results.

11 Evidently, one sub-dimension may be politically relevant, while the other is not.

12 This implies assessing the responsiveness of parties, not of individual legislators. Theoretically, we may therefore underestimate chains of accountability that run from voters to individual representatives in weakly structured party systems. Measuring individual representation would require a very different analytical approach, however, which is impossible unless we had information on the position of individual representatives that survey respondent voted for.

13 As a rule of thumb, I consider issue categories loading |0.4| or higher on the canonical variables derived from the discriminant analysis of party positions as constitutive for the dimension. Consequently, I use only those categories to reconstruct the conflict dimensions at the voter level. In all cases, I took care to ensure that the issue categories contributed to a similar degree to the factors at the voter level as they did to the canonical variables at the party level.

The differing scales are not a problem in correlations because the latter tap only the covariance between positions.

In the next section, I first provide a summary of the dimensions structuring party positions in the seven countries studied, and then present graphs showing the positions of parties and voters on those dimensions.

5. Patterns of responsiveness after re-democratization in Latin America

5.1 The nature of ideological divisions

While the analysis of congruence will be based on the dimensions found to separate parties, I present results of discriminant analyses performed both at the elite and at the voter level in this section. Table 1 summarizes party and voter dimensions. I have provided labels for divides based on the issue categories that are associated with them, which are listed in descending order of importance in the third and the fifth column. The full results are provided in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix.

In terms of the conflicts structuring party systems across our sample, two groups of countries stand out. In the first group, composed of Chile and Uruguay, the regime divide emerges as the dimension most clearly setting legislators apart based on their party affiliation. Interestingly, these are the two countries whose historical trajectory discussed at the outset of this paper leads me to expect party systems to be most responsive to voter preferences. In Uruguay, the most important party system divide is almost exclusively determined by the army issue. I interpret this as a regime divide because positions regarding the army are significantly correlated with assessments of the military regime of the 1970s, yet display much more variance. Basically, legislators almost unanimously view the military dictatorship as negative, yet differ starkly in their view of the military today. By contrast, in Chile legislators differ significantly in their assessment of the Pinochet dictatorship, and the regime divide is thus measured using this issue. Although economic liberalism also plays a role in defining the first dimension, the regime issue sets parties apart much more powerfully. Chile also features a second divide between cultural conservatism and cultural liberalism, reminiscent of the country's religious cleavage. In both Chile and Uruguay, the very same dimensions found among elites also divide electorates.

Table 1: **Dimensions of competition at the elite and mass levels in seven Latin American countries, mid-1990s. Results of canonical linear discriminant analyses**

Country	Party dimensions	Issues	Dimensions among electorates	Issues
Group 1: Regime as most salient divide on party side				
Uruguay	Regime divide (1)	Army Secondary loading: welfare	Regime-cultural divide	Regime, cultural liberalism Secondary loading: Welfare
Chile	Regime-economic divide	Regime, economic liberalism Secondary loading: cultural liberalism	Regime divide	Regime
	Cultural divide	Cultural liberalism	Cultural divide	Ecology, cultural liberalism
Group 2: Socio-economic divides most salient on party side				
Argentina	Economic divide	Welfare, economic liberalism Secondary loadings: cultural liberalism, regime	Cultural-regime divide	Cultural liberalism, regime Secondary loadings: welfare
Colombia	Socio-economic divide	Privatization (2), cultural liberalism Secondary loading: army (3)	Weak cultural-regime divide (4)	Cultural liberalism, regime Secondary loading: economic liberalism
Mexico	Socio-economic divide	Cultural liberalism, welfare, economic liberalism	Weak regime-cultural-economic divide (5)	Regime, cultural liberalism, protectionism (6)
	Regime divide	Army (7)	Weak socio-economic divide (8)	Economic liberalism, cultural liberalism, protectionism
Venezuela	Socio-economic divide (9)	Welfare, cultural liberalism, ecology Secondary loading: Army (10)	Weak welfare-regime divide (not significant)	Welfare, regime

Residual category: no statistically significant divides at party level

Peru	Regime-economic divide (not significant)	Army, welfare	Weak cultural-regime divide (11)	Cultural liberalism, regime

Notes: Issue categories loading |0.4| or higher on the discriminant functions are interpreted as constitutive for the dimension. Most correlations are much higher, and loadings are reported as "secondary" if the correlation is > |0.35|. See the detailed results in Table A3.

Footnotes:

1) Discriminant analysis yields a second relevant function with a canonical correlation of 0.48, significant at 0.01, but this dimension is difficult to interpret (especially when looking at the positions of parties) and only accounts for 12% of the variance explained by the model. For this reason, only the first dimension is analyzed in Uruguay.

2) Factor analysis of items measuring economic liberalism yields a separate privatization issue dimension.

3) Operationalization of army issue category yields a two-dimensional solution. The dimension showing a moderately strong secondary loading on the discriminant function (corr.=0.38) encompasses the issues "army guarantees a sovereign state", "army should be a force of national development", negative overall assessment of the military.

4) Cononical correlation of first canonical function is only 0.23, but is highly significant (p=0.000 level).

5) Canonical correlation=0.21, p=0.000.

6) Economic protectionism does not form part of the economic liberalism issue category in Mexico.

7) Operationalization of army issue category yields a two-dimensional solution. The dimension loading on the discriminant function encompasses all items except "army should be a force of national development".

8) Canonical correlation=0.15, p=0.001.

9) Discriminant analysis yields a second function with a canonical correlation of 0.44, but this function is not significant (p=0.34). Moreover, it is structured by cultural liberalism, army, and to some degree by welfare, and is thus mostly redundant with the first function.

10) See footnote 7.

11) Canonical correlation 0.20 (p=0.002)

In the second group of countries, economic divides or socio-economic divides that mix economic issues with cultural liberalism and sometimes other issues are decisive. In Argentina, parties differ mostly in terms of a state-market antagonism that juxtaposes a welfare statist position and economic liberalism. The mass divide based on cultural liberalism and the regime issue is at least associated with these issues setting parties apart. To a (limited) extent, we thus find party and voter dimensions to correspond. Moreover, the fact that the most important divide is structured by economic issues mirrors the strong historical polarization between Peronist and anti-Peronist camps. As we shall see, however, parties occupy unexpected positions along this divide.

The other countries with predominantly socio-economic conflicts differ from Argentina in that ideological divisions between electorates are weak, and often correspond much less with those represented in the party system. This may be a consequence of a weak structuring of belief systems among voters.[14] Nonetheless, the divisions represented by parties may reflect their voters' preferences, which will be assessed in the next sub-section. Two cases stand out among the remaining countries, however. First, Mexico features a two-dimensional structure of political space both at elite and the mass levels, and there is some important overlap in the relevant issue categories shaping those two divides at the elite and the mass levels. This leads me to expect a partial deviation from the low quality of representation that the historical analysis suggested. Secondly, Peru is the only country where the analysis fails to reveal a

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14 This is also reflected in the rather weak association between the specific items used to measure issue categories.

statistically significant ideological division at the elite level. Voters' party choices are also only weakly structured by ideology, suggesting that congruence is likely to be low.

5.2 Assessing the congruence of representation

Figures 1-9 present graphs showing the positions of parties and of their voters along the divides identified in the preceding section. The upper dimension in each figure represents the positions of parties and the lower dimension the position of electorates.[15] Often, the WVS allows an identification of parties not identified in the PELA surveys, but in the interest of legibility, minor parties are not shown in the figures. Apart from the mean position of parties and electorates, the figures also represent the homogeneity or heterogeneity of positions, calculated as the standard deviation of positions within a party or an electorate. Beyond reflecting how strongly parties and electorates are united by ideology, this also indicates the overlap of positions across parties or electorates. Finally, the correlation between the positions of parties and electorates is indicated below each figure, together with the number of party-electorate pairs on which the correlation is based.

Cases with favorable historical preconditions

Figures 1 present the results for *Uruguay.* The party system is strongly polarized along the regime divide, and parties clearly fall into two camps. The Colorados (PC) and the Blancos/Partido Nacional (PN), the two traditional parties, form a pro-military camp. The Frente Amplio (FA) and Nuevo Espacio (NE, which later fused with the former) form the pro-democratic/pacifist camp. This line-up is mirrored at the voter side, especially on the right, and there is virtually no overlap between the positions of the voters of the traditional parties and the Frente Amplio. This is remarkable since positions of parties are determined using their positions regarding the army, while those of voters are measured in terms of items relating to the regime dimension. By this measure, Nuevo Espacio's electorate tends to be more centrist than the party itself. Nonetheless, the correlation reflects a high degree of congruence between political supply and demand.

Figure 1: Uruguay – Parties and Voters on the Regime Divide


Match (4 parties): 0.89
Legend: FA, Frente Amplio; NE, Nuevo Espacio; PN, Partido National; PC, Partido Colorado.

More strongly than in Uruguay, the regime divide has an economic component in *Chile,* and party position are even more polarized (Figure 2). As in Uruguay, two clearly separated camps are revealed by

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15 The range of the graphs for the party side is -3 to 3, while those for voters run from -1 to 1. The different scales are the result of the different methods used to determine positions (discriminant analysis for parties and factor analysis for voters). The range on the party dimension uses Chile, which along its first dimension has the most polarized party system, as a benchmark case. Voter positions, on the other hand, are measured on standardized scales. Using a range from -1 to 1 facilitates the interpretation of the position of electorates relative to the overall distribution.

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the analysis, the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD), the Socialists (PS), and the Christian Democrats (DC) taking a pro-democracy position, while Renovatión Nacional (RN) and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) hold favorable views of the Pinochet dictatorship. The regime divide is clearly mirrored in the Chilean electorate, as there is hardly any overlap between the electorates of the left and right (remember that we must be cautious to interpret the positions of electorates as more centrist than those of parties due to differences in question wording).[16] The figure for Match shows an almost perfect correlation between the positions of parties and those of their electorates.

**Figure 2: Chile – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Economic Liberalism Divide**

Match (5 parties): 0.98
Legend: PPD, Partido Por la Democracia; PS, Socialist Party; DC, Christian Democrat Party; RN, Renovatión Nacional; UDI, Unión Demócrata Independiente.

The second dimension in Chile is enlightening because it helps to explain alignments *within* the pro-democratic and authoritarian blocks. Thus, with regard to moral issues related to the traditional religious cleavage, one party in each block switches sides on the second dimension: Renovatión National joins the culturally liberal camp, while the Christian Democrats form the culturally traditionalist camp together with UDI. Among parties, this dimension is far less polarized than the regime divide, however. On the voter side, the relative positions of parties are more or less mirrored by party electorates, but they display high degrees of overlap in the spread of their positions. Although both divides thus play a role in structuring partisan alignments in Chile, we can conclude that the second division is less important than the first. This is also reflected in the somewhat lower Match in the positions of parties and voters.

Figure 3: Chile – Parties and Voters on the Cultural Liberalism Divide

Match (5 parties): 0.83
Legend: see Figure 2.

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16 Contrary to the other cases, discriminant analysis of voter positions reveals a first dimension exactly identical to that found to structure party positions in Chile. For this reason, I directly use the first discriminant function to position voters in Chile. The second dimension is operationalized using only cultural liberalism, as the second function in the discriminant analysis is heavily structured by environmental protection, which hardly plays any role on the party side.

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With respect to Uruguay and Chile, the high levels of responsiveness displayed by party systems in the mid-1990s conforms to the expectations derived from the historical analysis. These are the two cases where historically formed partisan attachments created favorable preconditions for the re-emergence of responsive party systems after re-democratization. For *Argentina,* on the other hand, I expected intermediate levels of responsiveness due to strong polarization between the 1940s and the 1960s, but a much more limited experience of open democratic competition. Figure 3 shows the economic dimension, and portrays the situation after the 1995 elections. These took place during Carlos Menem's presidency, who performed a policy switch from the traditional state interventionist penchant of the Peronist movement to an appraisal of economic liberalism. Figure 3 shows that the Peronists (Partido Justicialista, PJ) and the Radicals (UCR) switched sides on the economic dimension as a consequence: The UCR takes a more state interventionist stance than its historical rival. Predictably, the most left-wing position is taken by FREPASO, a spin-off disagreeing with the Peronists' endorsement of free markets.

Figure 4: Argentina – Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide

Match (3 parties): 0.86

Legend: FREPASO, Frente para un País Solidario; UCR, Unión Cívica Radical; PJ, Partido Justicialista (Peronists); no vote, respondents who declare they would not vote or would vote blank if elections were held the next day.

Although party electorates are not strongly differentiated along the economic dimension, they do line up in the same order as the parties themselves, resulting in a high measure of correspondence between political demand and supply. This seems to indicate that Peronist voters to some degree followed the party into more economically liberal terrain. On the other hand, the difference between PJ and UCR is minimal, leaving ample room for non-ideological linkages, which are considered to play an important role according to the country-specific literature. In particular, some authors have suggested that the Peronists increasingly relied on clientelism to make their lower-class support base swallow their liberal economic policies (Brusco et al. 2004, Stokes 2005, Levitsky 2007). At the same time, the results point to some disenchantment with parties on the part of left-leaning voters, as non-voters take a relatively distinct left-wing position to the left of FREPASO supporters, as shown in Figure 4 (in most of the other figures, non voters are not shown due to their centrist positions).

Countries lacking favorable historical preconditions

Among the remaining countries, *Peru* shares with Argentina the historical feature of a strong progressive party. The Peruvian trajectory deviates from the Argentine path, however, in that the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) moved to the center or even further to the right from the 1950s on (Collier and Collier 2002: 477). This is reflected in the party's position on the divide that meshes regime issues and economic positions in Figure 5. APRA is situated close to the Unión por el Perú (UPP)[17], while

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17 UPP was founded in 1994 and later fused with the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP).

Cambio '90, the vehicle whereby Alberto Fujimori gained the presidency, occupies the most left-wing position. The other parties cannot be positioned due to their limited representation in the legislature. As pointed out in the preceding section, the regime-economic divide is a weak predictor of legislators' party membership. Nonetheless, parties exhibit relatively distinct average positions. At the same time, individual legislators are not necessarily that different in outlook, as the standard deviation around the average position shows. Figure 5 reveals that electorates to a very large degree overlap in their policy preferences. What is more, the congruence of representation is damaged by the fact that APRA's electorate is in fact the most left-wing and most skeptical of military involvement in politics, which does not correspond to the party's position. All in all, the party system is clearly unresponsive to the preferences of voters. Consequently, although considered one of Latin America's best organized mass parties (McDonald and Ruhl 1989: 214-5, Stokes 2005: 318), APRA's move to the center-right and the lack of a strong conservative opponent resulted in a failure to push the party system in a programmatic direction.

Figure 5: Peru – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Economic Divide

Match (3 parties): -0.02
Legend: CAMBIO '90, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría; APRA, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana; UPP, Unión por el Perú.

The remaining cases share with Peru a lack of prolonged periods of ideological polarization that would have anchored party systems in the populace. More obviously so than in Peru, however, the experiences of Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico represent instances of aborted polarization. In Colombia, the traditional parties restricted competition, while victorious revolutionary movements established dominance in the two other countries. In Mexico, this resulted in single party dominance that was only overcome in 2000. In Venezuela, a two-party system eventually resulted from the 1958 pact, but as I have argued, there is abundant evidence that this compromise entailed a loss of parties' distinct programmatic profiles.

Figure 6 presents the positions of parties and voters on the socio-economic divide in *Colombia*.[18] At the time of the elite survey, the two traditional parties still held roughly three quarters of the seats in parliament. While their positions appear to some degree distinct, the Liberal Party (PL) being more economically left-wing, more culturally liberal, as well as more skeptical of the army, this difference is not mirrored in the location of their electorates. Not only do the traditional parties' electorates overlap to a large degree, but the Conservative Party's base actually appears slightly more to the left than that of the

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18 Among elites, one of the components of the army category shows a secondary loading on this dimension. When reconstructing this dimension on the voter side, I have omitted the regime category in order to avoid the socio-economic dimension from becoming strongly shaped by the regime issue. First of all, including the regime issue in the factor analysis results in a factor much closer to regime than to privatization, which may measure something distinct from the socio-economic dimension among legislators. Secondly, while the regime issue can be considered a functional equivalent for orientations regarding the army in some contexts, we cannot be sure of this in Colombia, where the army is not associated with a prior regime.

Liberals. The results thus confirm the hypothesis that these two parties are not connected to their voters by means of programmatic linkages.[19] On the party side, Coalición takes a clearly distinct position, but unfortunately, its electorate cannot be identified in the WVS.[20] As a result of their limited number of parliamentary representatives, we lack information on left-wing parties in the PELA survey. The most electorally important of these is Movimento Cívico Independiente (INDEP), which roughly 15% of survey respondents claim to support. This party's electorate escapes the centrist dynamic of the supporters of the traditional parties by taking more left-wing and more culturally liberal positions. Nonetheless, the INDEP electorate is far from ideologically homogeneous, as shown by the large standard deviation. We can thus conclude that the continuing lack of viable parties on the left precludes the Colombian party system from achieving responsiveness.

Figure 6: Colombia – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide

Match (2 parties): -1.0

Legend: PL, Partido Liberal Colombiano; PC, Partido Conservador Colombian; COALICION, Coalición; INDEP, Movimento Cívico Independiente.

While the countries discussed thus far conform to the expectations generated by the historical analysis, Venezuela and Mexico display higher levels of congruence between party positions and voter preferences than we would have expected. This is due to the fact that the analysis of the mid-1990s only provides a snapshot of party system dynamics, with opposition parties in Mexico pushing the systems towards responsiveness, while they ultimately failed to do so in Venezuela.

While *Venezuela's* party system had been characterized by extraordinary stability between 1958 and the 1980s, it virtually collapsed just ten years later. Three years prior to Hugo Chávez' victory of the presidency, the party system appears quite responsive along the socio-economic divide in Figure 7. This is due to the presence of left-wing alternatives to the traditional parties. Indeed, Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI, the two main antagonists prior to 1958, hardly occupy distinct positions, and neither do their voters. The space to the left of the socio-economic divide is occupied by Causa R and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), while Convergencia National (CONV), a spin-off from the long-established COPEI, occupies the middle ground. As far as MAS voters are concerned, these contrasting positions are reflected in the electorate, while the same cannot be said of Causa R and Convergencia. Nonetheless, the Venezuelan party system attains moderately high levels for Match between political supply and demand. From this perspective, the subsequent implosion of the party system came rather unexpected.

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19 The fact that an – albeit weak – ideological dimension results from the discriminant analysis on the voter side is due exclusively to the minor parties of the left, whose voters display more clear-cut profiles. A separate analysis based only on the contrast between PC and PL yields a function that is neither significant, nor correlated with the issue variables.

20 Although Coalición is considered a conservative party, it appears quite left-wing on the first discriminant function. Its position with respect to the second function (which is not significant, however) reveals a clearly right-wing economic profile.

Figure 7: Venezuela – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide


Match (5 parties): 0.75

Legend: CAUSA R, La Causa Radical; MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; CONV, Convergencia National; AD, Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente.

Figure 7 masks the fact, however, that the system was only feebly anchored in the voting population. According to the WVS, 47% of respondents declared they would not vote for any party, a number far higher than in the other countries (see Table A5 in the Appendix). If my historical argument is correct, the party system progressively lost its roots in society due to the failure of the two major parties to offer differing policy packages to voters. Furthermore, the high number of respondents not professing a preference for any party shows that the parties of the left, which did gain more support in the late 1980s and the 1990s, did not succeed in re-establishing confidence in party politics. Rather, it seems that the reign of AD and COPEI eroded support for democracy in the Venezuelan populace (Canache 2002). Presumably, many of those disillusioned with political parties then supported Chávez' bid for the presidency in 1998.

In Mexico, we encounter a situation a few years before the victory of the long-established Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) finally ended the Partido Revolucionario Institucional's (PRI) dominance in the 2000 elections. Figure 8 shows the socio-economic divide in 1995. PRI occupies a center-left position and is challenged by the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) to its left and by the PAN to its right. On the voter side, the PRI's electorate is actually the most left-wing. Nonetheless, the correlation between supply and demand is moderately high. The figure for Match is to some degree misleading as the differences between electorates are minimal, both in terms of their average position and with respect to the overlap resulting from their internal heterogeneity. As more detailed analyses show, the aggregation of dimensions at the voter level destroys statistically significant differences between electorates with respect to economic liberalism, support for the welfare state, and cultural liberalism (results not shown). This suggests that the way parties aggregate issues into the prime dimension of party competition in Mexico is not a reflection of their voters' preferences. Consequently, the congruence of representation is rather low in reality. In part, the low level of differentiation between electorates along the socio-economic dimension may be due to the fact that this dimension is cross-cut by a regime divide. While opposition parties in Mexico had difficulties in defeating the PRI due to their non-centrist economic policy positions (Greene 2007), they are united against their long-term rival (and the miniscule PT) along the army dimension, as can be seen in Figure 9. On the voter side, positions are measured using those regime items that do not directly address the democratic ideal, but rather ask about preferences regarding a strong leader and the role of the army. The rather close Match between parties and voters along this dimension suggests that we are measuring a regime-cum-army dimension at both levels. Again, however, there is a large overlap in the positions of electorates, and the group professing no party preference stands out for having the most pro-democratic preferences. In light of the centrist position of the PRI on the socio-economic divide (which is difficult to defeat unless the opposition joins forces), the growing salience of the regime dimension seems to have contributed to the PRI's loss of power in the 2000 election. After decades of dominance by the PRI, the

Mexican party system thus became more responsive in the 1990s, as this analysis shows, and this ultimately resulted in the transition to a more competitive regime.

Figure 8: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide

Match (3 parties): 0.73

Legend: PRD, Partido de la Revolución Democrática; PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional; PAN, Partido Acción Nacional; PT, Partido del Trabajo.

Figure: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Army Divide

Match (3 parties): 0.85
Legend: see Figure 8.

Conclusion

This paper has presented evidence for vast differences in the congruence of representation across seven Latin American countries. Based on an analysis of the dimensions setting parties apart, I have measured to which degree the positions of parties are mirrored by those of their electorates. The differences revealed can be explained rather well by historical patterns of party system formation. In countries that experienced longer periods of ideological polarization, and thus developed responsive party systems in the first half of the 20th century, party systems proved similarly responsive to voter preferences in the mid-1990s. Whether or not countries democracy survived in the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, has left no traces on party systems. Strong loyalties between social groups and political parties have the capacity to survive authoritarian periods, party systems re-surfaced in remarkably similar shape in Uruguay and Chile in the 1980s. But even if the party system appears stable at first sight, the dimensions underlying political conflict may change. Indeed, it is remarkable that regime divides – setting apart pro-democratic and authoritarian forces – structure party systems precisely in Uruguay and Chile, which exhibit the highest levels of responsiveness among the countries studied. Parties in Argentina also show rather high levels of responsiveness, despite the fact that the Peronists performed a shift from statist to pro-market policies in the 1990s. Apparently, parties strongly anchored in the populace are able to convince voters of non-orthodox positions and shift their preferences to some degree. This finding is in line with a growing emphasis on the role of agency in cleavage politics (Bornschier 2009; see also Disch 2011).

Low levels of congruence, on the other hand, are an indication that distinctive policy propositions are not parties' main currency in mobilizing voters. Ideology's main rival, of course, is clientelism. Although

it is difficult to measure clientelism directly, analyzing the congruence of representation allows an indirect assessment of whether parties use clientelistic resources to attract voters. To some degree, programmatic and clientelistic linkages are compatible, and we cannot read off the occurrence of clientelist exchanges from the congruence of representation directly. But it is possible to assess whether clientelism takes on its most appalling form from a normative perspective, and precludes voters from exerting any influence on government policies. From this perspective, party systems in Uruguay and Chile, and to some degree also in Argentina (and possible Mexico) meet high normative standards, as distinctive policies clearly play an important role in voter-party alignments. It is also in these countries (and again most clearly in Uruguay and Chile) that the divisions in the electorate correspond rather closely to those found among elites. This is an indication of strong programmatic linkages that operate from voters to parties and vice-versa.

By contrast, weak dimensions underlying party positions point to a lack of programmatic structuring. Likewise, centrist average positions of electorates in ideological terms are accompanied by strong internal heterogeneity, indicating that they are held together by a system of particularistic exchanges, impeding voters from influencing national policy. Policy is clearly not what party-voter linkages were primarily about in Peru, Colombia, and presumably not in Venezuela and Mexico until recently. Although Colombia had formally been a democracy for several decades, the exclusion of the left and the lack of meaningful policy-based competition results in low levels of congruence. This confirms qualitative evidence presented earlier, according to which Colombian parties primarily rely on clientelistic resources to attract voters. The same can be said of the two parties that have jointly dominated politics in Venezuela. In the mid-1990s, they differed little in terms of ideology, and likewise, their electorates are not distinguishable in ideological terms either. Although new left-wing parties have to some degree filled the ideological void, they have not been able to halt the erosion of the party system that ultimately paved the way for Chávez' assault on political parties and democratic institutions more generally.

Contrary to Colombia and Venezuela's highly stable party systems, electoral vehicles came and went in Peru, with the notable exception of APRA. In the absence of a strong conservative counter-pole, and given that APRA became more conservative and itself employed clientelistic modes of mobilization, Peru is the only country without a clear ideological divide in the party system. Apart from making clientelism pervasive, this presumably also ebbed the way for Fujimori's charismatic mobilization as yet another alternative to programmatic linkages.

Finally, the case of Mexico shows that political agency can overcome historical patterns, which should by no means be considered deterministic. Opposition parties displayed distinctive policy profiles along the socio-economic and the regime divides several years before a PAN candidate finally won the presidential elections in 2000. This underscores the role of ideology in ousting clientelism. For decades, the PRI had not only enjoyed a monopoly on clientelistic resources, but had also occupied the political center, while the opposition was split between the left-leaning PRI and the right-wing PAN. However, my analysis has revealed the presence of a regime dimension in Mexican politics. Thus, when the PAN moved to the center in the 2000 campaign (Greene 2007), the economic divide ceased to cross-cut the regime divide in ways that had secured the PRI's dominant position.

To move beyond the snapshot provided by this paper, and in order to assess the stability of the country differences put in evidence, the analysis should be extended to more recent electoral periods. Several changes can be expected, from a change of the content of ideological conflicts where regime divides have been dominant immediately after re-democratization, to the reappearance of ideological conflict in Venezuela. Furthermore, other countries may follow the Mexican path, if new political actors are

strengthened or when externally mobilized parties make their first appearance. Brazil, unfortunately is not covered by the data used in this paper, is a candidate.

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Appendix

Table A1: Operationalization of Issue Categories at the Elite Level (based on PELA surveys)

p42	Should state-owned industries be privatized? (1)		Economic liberalism
p43	Should public services be privatized? (1)		
p35a01	Desired degree of state intervention: Price control (2)		
p35a04	Desired degree of state intervention: Guarantee jobs (2)		
p35a03	Desired degree of state intervention: Provide housing		Welfare
p35a06	Desired degree of state intervention: Social insurance for all		
P35a08	Desired degree of state intervention: Unemployment benefits		
P35a10	Desired degree of state intervention: Cover all citizens' basic needs		
p35a02	Desired degree of state intervention: Primary education	Education (3)	
p35a05	Desired degree of state intervention: Secondary education		
p35a05	Desired degree of state intervention: University education		
p35a09	Desired degree of state intervention: Protecting the environment		Environmental protection
p73	Opinion concerning divorce: in favor or opposed		Cultural liberalism
p74	Opinion concerning abortion: in favor or opposed		
p30a	Assessment of role of military during recent dictatorship (only in those countries that experienced military dictatorships)		Regime
p32a01	Agreement: Army guarantees a sovereign state		Army (4)
p32a02	Agreement: The army's budget should be reduced		
p32a03	Agreement : The army's functions should be transferred to the police		
p32a04	Agreement : The army should be a force of national development		
p31a	Assessment of the military's role today		

Note on missing values: After a test of the dimensionality of the items assigned to each category, missing values were imputed for each item based on the other items from the same category (or sub-category, if the items proved to be more-dimensional).

Footnotes:
(1) Privatization forms a separate dimension in some countries (see Table 1). In these cases, economic liberalism and privatization were included as separate categories in the discriminant analyses.
(2) In Uruguay, these items prove strongly related to the items measuring welfare attitudes, and are therefore included to form the welfare category.
(3) Because they are very similar in content and highly correlated, the items pertaining to education are first combined into an index using factor analysis. The education index is then used together with the other items to operationalize the welfare category.
(4) The items measuring positions regarding the army often produced two-dimensional solutions (see Table 1). In these cases, the two components were included as separate categories in the discriminant analyses.

Table A2: Operationalization of Issue Categories at the Voter Level (based on WVS)

v126	Private vs. public ownership?	Economic liberalism
v128	Competition: good or harmful?	
v1330	Import foreign goods vs. protectionism	
v125	Should incomes be made more equal?	Welfare
v127	Government responsibility that everyone is provided for?	
v41	Growth vs. environmental protection	Environmental protection
v38	Increase taxes to protect the environment?	
v1990	Opinion concerning abortion: justifiable?	Cultural liberalism
v2001	Opinion concerning divorce: justifiable	
v151	Assessment of role of military during recent dictatorship (only in those countries that experienced military dictatorships)	Regime (1)
v154	Good or bad to have a strong leader who does not have to care about congress and elections?	
v156	Good or bad to have the army rule?	
v157	Good or bad to have a democratic system?	
v159	Priority: Maintain order or respect individual freedom?	
v161	Agree or disagree: Too much squabbling in democracy	
v163	Agree or disagree: Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best form of government	

Note on missing values: After a test of the dimensionality of the items assigned to each category, missing values were imputed for each item based on the other items from the same category (or sub-category, if the items proved to be more than one-dimensional).

Footnote:

1) Attitudes regarding political regime are frequently more than one-dimensional. This information can be found in Tables 1 and A2.

Table A3: Results of Canonical Linear Discriminant Analyses of Legislators' Issue Positions (based on PELA elite surveys)

	Uruguay		Chile		Argentina	Colombia	Mexico		Venezuela	Peru
	Regime divide	Secondary dimension (not shown)	Regime-economic divide	Cultural divide	Economic divide	Socio-economic divide	Socio-economic divide	Regime-army divide	Socio-economic divide	Regime-economic divide
Economic issues										
Welfare	*0.37*	**-0.66**	-0.28	0.03	**-0.55**	-0.09	**-0.54**	-0.06	**0.73**	**-0.47**
Economic liberalism	– (1)	– (1)	**-0.48**	0.12	**-0.92**	0.19	**-0.44**	-0.09	0.22	**-0.44**
Privatization (if distinct)	-0.24	0.20				**-0.65**	-0.29	-0.03		
Non-economic issues										
Regime	0.26	0.14	**-0.85**	0.28	*-0.38*	– (2)	– (2)	– (2)	– (2)	0.03
Army	**0.78**	**0.52**	-0.44	-0.17	-0.01	-0.23	0.28 (3)	**-0.92**	0.18	**-0.65**
Army 2 (if distinct)						*0.38*	0.07 (3)	0.13	*0.36*	
Cultural liberalism	0.31	**-0.42**	*-0.37*	**-0.89**	*-0.37*	**-0.55**	**-0.64**	-0.19	**0.49**	0.14
Environmental protection	0.21	-0.19	-0.02	-0.15	0.04	*0.34*	-0.12	-0.04	**0.45**	**-0.44**
N	73		87		48	80	122		66	71
Canonical correlation	0.82	0.48	0.90	0.59	0.63	0.53	0.74	0.57	0.59	0.45
Eigenvalue	2.04	0.30	4.31	0.54	0.65	0.38	1.23	0.47	0.53	0.26
Proportion of variance of total model explained	84%	12%	87%	11%	97%	77%	72%	27%	63%	98%
p-value of F-statistic	0.000	0.01	0.000	0.001	0.08	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.02	0.32

Note: Loadings are canonical structure coefficients. Beyond the first dimension, only statistically significant functions are reported.

Footnotes:
1) In Uruguay, economic liberalism items loads on the same factor as welfare, while only items pertaining to privatization are distinct
2) No military dictatorship prior to the 1990s, regime item not applicable in these countries.
3) See note to Table 1

Table A4: Results of Canonical Linear Discriminant Analyses of Voters' Issue Positions (based on WVS)

	Uruguay		Chile		Argentina	Colombia	Mexico		Venezuela	Peru
	Regime-cultural divide	Economic-regime divide	Regime divide	Cultural-ecology-divide	Cultural-regime divide	Cultural-regime divide	Regime-cultural-economic	Socio-economic divide	Welfare-regime divide	Cultural-regime divide
Economic issues										
Welfare	*-0.37*	0.22	-0.17	-0.20	*-0.37*	-0.16	**-0.46**	0.18	**-0.57**	0.29
Economic liberalism	-0.26	**0.72**	-0.11	0.24	-0.15	*0.38*	0.24	**0.62**	-0.21	-0.02
Protectionism (if distinct)							**0.42**	**0.47**	0.19	
Non-economic issues										
Regime	**-0.73**	**-0.41**	**-0.96**	0.02	**-0.52**	**-0.69**	**-0.52** (1)	-0.09	**0.51** (2)	**-0.48**
Regime 2 (if distinct)	-0.09	**-0.40**					-0.25 (1)	0.01	-0.26 (2)	
Cultural liberalism	**-0.65**	0.15	-0.13	**0.49**	**-0.83**	**-0.67**	**-0.43**	**0.60**	-0.21	**-0.77**
Environmental protection	-0.07	-0.27	-0.05	**0.76**	-0.18	-0.24	0.05	-0.25	-0.28	0.08
Group means	FA: 0.55	-0.54	PS: 0.53	-0.38	PJ: -0.22	IND: 0.42	PT: -0.73	-0.49	CON: 0.20	C'90: -0.08
	NE: 0.17	0.31	PPD: 0.31	0.09	UCR: 0.03	UP: 0.41	PRI: -0.13	0.16	C-R: 0.23	APR: -0.21
	PC: -0.60	-0.15	DC: 0.17	0.11	FRE: 0.43	PC: -0.11	PRD: 0.24	-0.14	MAS: -0.50	UPP: 0.45
	PN: -0.39	0.17	RN: -0.75	-0.14		PL: -0.15	PAN: 0.05	-0.00	COP: 0.11	
			UDI: -1.01	0.01					AD: -0.11	
N	701		532		574	1'929	1'086		477	590
Canonical correlation	0.46	0.14	0.45	0.16	0.26	0.23	0.21	0.15	0.19	0.20
Eigenvalue	0.26	0.02	0.26	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.04
Proportion of variance of total model explained	90.1%	7.3%	83.5%	8.9%	89.5%	91.1%	55.5%	30.1%	48.5%	78%
p-value of F-statistic	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.226	0.002

Note: Loadings are canonical structure coefficients. Beyond the first dimension, only statistically significant functions are reported.

Footnotes:
1) Regime category encompasses all issues except items pertaining to support for democracy, which form a separate dimension (Regime 2).
2) Regime is associated with democracy and authoritarianism, while Regime 2 is related to perceptions of "too much squabbeling in democracy", as well as the assessment of the political regime in place ten years before.

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Table A5: Share of World Values Survey Respondents Declaring they would not Vote for any Party or Professing no Party Preference

Country	„Niguno"	„No sabe"	Total
Argentina	14,9%	19,8%	34,7%
Chile	30,5%	9,0%	39,5%
Colombia	31,3%	2,8%	34,1%
Mexico	11,9%	14,5%	26,4%
Peru	17,3%	19,3%	36,6%
Uruguay	11,3%	17,5%	28,8%
Venezuela	47,1%	11,7%	58,8%